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‘Security for Costs’ Under the
ICSID Regime: Does it Prevent
‘Arbitral Hit-and-Runs’ or Does it
Unduly Stifle Third-Party Funded
Investors’ Due Process Rights?
Young Hye (Martina) Chun*
Abstract: This Article considers security for costs under the
ICSID regime. Given that all security for costs have been
ordered against third-party funded investors—with the latest
decision, Unionmatex, in January 2020, this Article
examines prior ICSID decisions to determine whether thirdparty funded investors are prejudiced when it comes to
security for costs.
It further addresses whether an
applicant’s right to a costs award is a “protectable right”
under Article 47 and concludes that it is not. Finding that
“arbitral hit-and-run” is a hypothetical concern not based on
empirical evidence and providing that ICSID’s new
proposed rules to its Arbitration Rules will only further
impede third-party funded parties’ right of access to justice,
this Article concludes that there is a clear prejudice against
third-party funded parties. Finally, this Article concludes
by reflecting that this prejudice may undermine one of the
purposes for which ICSID Convention was created: to
provide a forum for aggrieved investors to resolve their
investment disputes—no matter how poor and regardless of
whether they are funded by a third-party.
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INTRODUCTION
Third-party funding (TPF)1 has increased substantially over
the past several years as a means to reduce the financial
burden of bringing an investment claim.2 For example, the
global market for TPF in both litigation and arbitration is
estimated as exceeding ten billion dollars. 3 Following
TPF’s growth, there have been concerns as to whether a
party funded by a TPF will “hit” a state with arbitration and
“run” without paying for a costs award since third-party
funders, as non-parties to arbitration, cannot be compelled to
pay costs—a scenario commonly referred to as arbitral hitand-run.4
In international investment arbitration, some respondent
states have resorted to security for costs to prevent this
* Young Hye (Martina) Chun is a Foreign Associate at Yulchon LLC, a global
law firm located in Seoul, South Korea, in their International Dispute
Resolution (“IDR”) Group. Thank you to Yulchon LLC for the opportunity to
work on this Article. She is a California-licensed attorney practicing
international arbitration and litigation and represents Korean companies in
various maritime, energy and insurance disputes. Previously, she obtained her
J.D. degree at Pepperdine School of Law where she edited for the Pepperdine
Dispute Resolution Law Journal (“DRLJ”) and obtained her LL.M. degree in
Alternative Dispute Resolution at USC School of Law.
1
For the purposes of this Article, “third-party funder” generally refers to any
non-party, which provides funding or resources for the purpose of financing
arbitration either as a donation or in return for remuneration dependent on the
outcome of the proceeding; See Sarah Moseley, Disclosing Third-Party
Funding in International Investment Arbitration, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1186–
88 (2019).
2
Moseley, supra note 1, at 1181–86.
3
INT’L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB., THE ICCA REPORTS NO. 4, REPORT OF THE
ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE ON THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 17 (2018) [hereinafter ICCA Task Report].
4
Jennifer Trusz, Full Disclosure? Conflict of Interest Arising from Third-Party
Funding in International Commercial Arbitration, 101 GEO. L.J. 1649, 1679
(2013) (“One concern is with the so-called “hit-and-run” scheme, whereby the
claimant abuses the system via the funding relationship: the claimant will gain
by succeeding in arbitration, but if it is unsuccessful, it lacks the financial ability
to pay for costs”).
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feared outcome. 5 Security for costs, an order directing a
party to set aside funds to satisfy potential adverse costs, has
been a rare specimen of remedies. Up until 2014, there
were no reported decisions awarding security for costs.6 As
of February 2020, there are now three known decisions all
with one common denominator—the existence of TPF.7
Such special emphasis on TPF is also apparent in the new
proposed rules to the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID)’s Arbitration Rules.8 While
only three known decisions have awarded security for costs,
ICSID has made it a priority to include a stand-alone
provision just for security for costs.9 If adopted, parties will
be required to affirmatively disclose their third-party
funder, 10 and tribunals will be endowed with authority to
dismiss proceedings if a party fails to comply with a security
for costs order.11 Combined with their express innuendo

5

See Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice
of International Commercial Arbitration, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 699, 754–55 (2016)
(“The possibility that an unsuccessful party may, in a final decision on the
merits of the case, be required to contribute to the costs of his adversary is
recognized in a number of legal systems, and indeed the ICC Rules permit
arbitrators to make such an award”).
6
Chiara Cilento & Benjamin Guthrie, Is Investor-State Arbitration Warming
up to Security of Costs?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (June 18, 2019),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/06/18/is-investor-statearbitration-warming-up-to-security-for-costs/ (“The order of security for costs
affirmed by the RSM ad hoc committee was hailed as groundbreaking when it
was published in 2014. No investment tribunal had previously issued such an
order.”).
7
See generally Cilento & Guthrie, supra note 6.
8
INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., WORKING PAPER #4,
PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENT OF THE ICSID RULES 58–59 (2020) [hereinafter
WORKING
PAPER
4],
ICSID
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/WP_4_Vol_1_En.pdf. Note: the
proposed rules for ICSID’s Arbitration Rules begin on page 27.
9
ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53).
10
ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 37-38. (Proposed Rule 14).
11
ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53(6)).
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that TPF is a factor to justify ordering security for costs,12
the proposed rules raise significant due process
consequences for third-party funded parties as well.
Given that arbitral hit-and-run concerns are not empirically
supported by previous incidents but rather rest on a “whatif” scenario, and since there are other measures to filter out
unmeritorious claims, this Article posits that security for
costs addresses a hypothetical concern at the cost of
investors’ real due process rights.
Part I of this Article sets the stage by introducing security for
costs and providing two opposing interests underlying
security for costs: “arbitral hit-and-run” concerns and a
party’s right of access to justice. Part II introduces Article
47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of the ICSID
Arbitration Rules and their applicability to security for costs.
Part III demonstrates that previous decisions have failed to
address whether adverse costs are “rights” entitled to
preservation under Article 47 and proposes that adverse
costs are not protectable rights. Part IV provides that
“arbitral hit-and-run” concerns are not based on any
empirical evidence and thus unwarranted. Part V delineates
pertinent Proposed Rules to the ICSID’s Arbitration Rules
and concludes that, if adopted, they would further impede
third-party funded parties’ access to due process.
I.
A.

SECURITY FOR COSTS

SECURITY FOR COSTS

“Security for costs” is a form of provisional measure, which
orders a party to post security to cover the applicant’s
expected costs in defending itself against the claim.13 The
12
13

ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53(4)).
SARAH BREWIN, BEST PRACTICES SERIES: SECURITIES FOR COSTS 1 (INT’L
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aim is to protect parties from the unfortunate outcome in
which they bear legal costs to defend unmeritorious claims
but cannot collect a potential costs award due to the other
party’s inability or unwillingness to pay.14
B.

ARBITRAL HIT-AND-RUN V. RIGHT
JUSTICE

OF

ACCESS

TO

Arbitral hit-and-run has been defined as a situation “where
the claimant’s arbitration fees and expenses are being
covered by a related entity or individual who stands to gain
if the claimant wins, but who would not be liable to meet any
award of costs that might be made against the claimant if it
lost.”15 On the other hand, there is a legitimate concern that
security for costs may burden a party’s right of access to
justice. 16 For a claimant who is going through financial
difficulties, perhaps due to a state’s misappropriation,
posting security may be impossible where costs of
international investment arbitration can reach tens of
millions of U.S. dollars. 17 Failing to comply with a
securities order may result in a termination of proceedings—
exemplifying the serious impact that security for costs may
have on a claimant’s due process rights.18
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (IISD) Oct. 2018).
14
BREWIN, supra note 13.
15
J.E. Kalicki, Security for Costs in International Arbitration, TRANSNAT'L.
DISPUTE
MGMT.
3
(2006),
https://www.transnational-disputemanagement.com/article.asp?key=827.
16
See Jean-Baptiste Pessey, When to Grant Security for Costs in International
Commercial Arbitration: the Complex Quest for a Uniform Test, CPR INT’L
INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. (May 6, 2011),
https://www.cpradr.org/news-publications/articles/2011-05-06-when-to-grantsecurity-for-costs-in-international-commercial-arbitration-the-complex-questfor-a-uniform-test-2011-writing-contest-winner.
17
DAVID GOLDBERG ET AL., 2019 EMPIRICAL STUDY: PROVISIONAL
MEASURES IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, BRITISH INST. OF INT’L &
COMPAR. L. 14 (White & Case, 2019).
18
RSM Production Corporation v. Saint Lucia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10,
Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 145-148 (Apr. 29, 2019).
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THE ICSID CONVENTION ON
“SECURITY FOR COSTS”

ARTICLE 47 AND RULE 39 OF THE ICSID
CONVENTION

Under the current ICSID regime, there is no rule particular
to security for costs.19 Rather, they operate under ICSID
Convention’s Section 3, Article 47 (Article 47) and ICSID’s
Arbitration Rule 39, which govern all forms of provisional
measures.20 Article 47 of the ICSID Convention allows a
tribunal to order any provisional measure to preserve a
party’s rights.21 Under Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration
Rules, any party may request a tribunal for a provisional
measure by “specify[ing] the rights to be preserved, the
measures the recommendation of which is requested, and the
circumstances that require such measures.”22
Because these rules are construed broadly, prior ICSID cases
have served as persuasive law for tribunals when
determining whether to order security for costs. 23 While
there is no doctrine of precedent—or stare decisis—in
ICSID arbitration, previous decisions have served a similar
function to compensate for the lack of guidance.24 When
addressing security for costs, tribunals have generally
applied the same requirements as for other provisional
19
Sam Luttrell, Observations on the Proposed new ICSID Regime for Security
for Costs, 36 J. INT’L ARB. 3, 3–5 (2019).
20
INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP., ICSID CONVENTION,
REGULATION
AND
RULES
24,
118,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/ICSID%20Convention%20Engli
sh.pdf. [hereinafter ICSID RULES].
21
ICSID RULES, supra note 20, at 24 (ICSID Convention, Article 47).
22
ICSID RULES, supra note 20, at 118 (ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 39).
23
Luttrell, supra note 19.
24
Luttrell, supra note 19.
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measures: (i) identification of the rights to be preserved, (ii)
requested measures to protect that interest, and (iii)
circumstances 25 that require such measures. 26 But for
security for costs, there has been one clear distinction, which
is requiring an “exceptional circumstance.”27
B.

“EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES”: MATERIAL
RISK THAT COST AWARD WILL NOT BE COMPLIED
WITH

While each tribunal attaches a different test to determine
whether an exceptional circumstance exists, there is a
general consensus for securities for costs—there must be a
material risk that adverse costs will not be complied with.28
In all three decisions ordering security for costs, the
existence of a TPF arrangement played a crucial factor,
albeit not the sole factor.
25

Occidental Petroleum Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/11, Decision on Provisional Measures, ¶ 59 (Aug. 17, 2007)
(“circumstances” defined as those for which “the measures are necessary to
preserve a party’s rights and where the need is urgent in order to avoid
irreparable harm”).
26
ICSID RULES, supra note 20, at 118 (ICSID Arbitration Rules, Article 39(1)):
At any time after the institution of the
proceeding, a party may request that
provisional
measures
for
the
preservation
of
its
rights
be
recommended by the Tribunal. The
request shall specify the rights to be
preserved,
the
measures
the
recommendation of which is requested,
and the circumstances that require such
measures.
27
Luttrell, supra note 19, at 4-5.
28
RSM Prod. Corp. v. Saint Lucia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10, Decision on
St. Lucia’s Request for Security for Costs, ¶¶ 77–82 (Aug. 12, 2014); Dirk
Herzig as Insolvency Administrator over the Assets of Unionmatex
Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Turkmenistan (hereinafter “Unionmatex”), ICSID
Case No. ARB/18/35, Decision on the Respondent’s Request for Security for
Costs and the Claimant’s Request for Security for Claim, ¶¶ 53–58 (Jan. 27,
2020).
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RSM Production Co. v. St. Lucia was the first known
occasion in which security for costs was ordered.29 In 2014,
the RSM majority tribunal granted St. Lucia’s request,
finding that (i) the claimant’s history of non-compliance
with costs awards in prior ICSID cases, (ii) its poor financial
status, and (iii) the existence of TPF created a material and
urgent risk that the claimant would not reimburse St.
Lucia—creating an “exceptional circumstance.” 30 While
RSM serves as a “landmark” case as the first decision to
order security for costs against a third-party funded party,
the existence of TPF seemed to have served as only an
ancillary factor, and the tribunal weighed the claimant’s
prior history of non-compliance heavily in ordering security
for costs. 31 The RSM proceeding was dismissed with
prejudice when claimant failed to comply with the security
for cost order.32
Four years later, in 2018, the second known security for costs
order was issued in Armas v. República Boliviariana de
Venezuela. 33 Relying on the RSM decision, the Armas
tribunal found that an exceptional circumstance existed since
(i) the claimants were funded by TPF, (ii) the claimants did
not have the resources to pay the adverse costs order, and
(iii) the underlying TPF arrangement precluded the funder
from any cost liability.34
Finally, Unionmatex v. Turkmenistan is the third and last
known decision to order security for costs, which was

29

RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶¶ 27, 53–54.
RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶¶ 77-84.
RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶¶ 81-82.
32
RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 18 (The Decision on Annulment).
33
Armas v. República Boliviariana de Venezuela, PCA Case No. 2016-08,
Decision on Request for Security for Costs, ¶ 261 (June 20, 2018).
34
Armas, supra note 33, at ¶¶ 199, 243–44, 250.
30
31
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rendered in January 2020. 35 In this case, which is still
ongoing, a third-party funded claimant brought a claim
against Turkmenistan alleging that its misappropriation
caused its insolvency. 36 The majority tribunal granted
Turkmenistan’s application for security for costs and found
that an exceptional circumstance existed on the following
grounds: (i) the claimant was insolvent, (ii) the existence of
TPF, and (iii) the funding arrangement explicitly absolving
the funder from cost liability, the same factor existing in
Armas. 37
Here, the third factor—TPF arrangement
absolving the funder from adverse cost liability—was found
to create a “more extreme situation.” 38 Reasoning that
neither the claimants nor the third-party funder would be
able to pay adverse costs due to the party’s impecuniosity or
the funder’s non-liability for costs, the tribunal found that an
exceptional circumstance existed.39
C.

PREJUDICE AGAINST THIRD-PARTY FUNDED
PARTIES

Until the RSM decision in 2014, not only were there no
decisions ordering security for costs in international
investment arbitration, but there were also no TPFs involved
in those cases. 40 Prior to RSM, the consistent view of
tribunals addressing security for cost has been that there is
no financial requirement to proceed in ICSID arbitration,41
35

Unionmatex, supra note 28.
Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 1.
37
Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 57-58.
38
Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 57.
39
Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 57–60.
40
For the purpose of this Article, sixteen reported ICSID security for cost
decisions were examined.
41
Grynberg et al. v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/6, Tribunal’s Decision
on Respondent’s Application for Security for Costs, ¶ 5.19 (October. 14, 2010)
(“[I]t is simply not part of the ICSID dispute resolution system that an investor’s
claim should be heard only upon the establishment of a sufficient standing of
the investor to meet a possible costs award”); Burimi et al. v. Republic of
36
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emphasizing the serious risk that such an order would have
in stifling a claimant’s right to due process.42
It was not until RSM, Armas, and Unionmatex that TPF arose
as a factor which helped to justify a securities for costs
order.43 In RSM, the tribunal reasoned that the existence of
TPF supports its concern that the claimant would not comply
with a costs award since “it is doubtful whether the third
party will assume responsibility for honoring such an
award.”44 In Armas and Unionmatex, the TPF arrangement
precluding the funder from costs liability served as a
determinative factor on the ground that, without the funder,
no one would be able to pay adverse costs.45
However, this scenario is not different from a scenario in
which there is only an insolvent party and no TPF. In both
scenarios, the risk of the applicant’s non-collection of costs
is the same—“either way, [the applicant] would not receive
an ordered reimbursement of its costs.”46 Since tribunals
Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/18, Procedural Order No.2, ¶ 41 (May 3,
2012) (“Tribunal would be reluctant to impose on the Claimants what amounts
to an additional financial requirement as a condition for the case to proceed”);
EuroGas Inc. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/14, Procedural
Order No.3, ¶ 123 (June 23, 2015); Lighthouse Corp. v. Democratic Republic
of Timor-Leste, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/2, Procedural Order No.2, ¶ 60 (Feb.
13, 2016) (“[T]here is no requirement in the ICSID system that a claimant must
demonstrate its solvency”).
42
Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/24, Award ¶ 17 (June 18, 2010) (Application or a security for cost
order rejected on the ground that “there was a serious risk that an order for
security for costs would stifle the claimant’s claims . . . .”).
43
RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶ 83; Armas, supra note 33. Unionmatex,
supra note 28, at ¶¶ 53–62.
44
RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶ 83.
45
Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 53–62.
46
Lars Markert, Security for Costs Applications in Investment Arbitrations
Involving Insolvent Investors, 11(2) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 217, 231 (Dec. 13,
2018),
available
at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295803 (last accessed
March 30, 2020).
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have held a party’s impecuniosity to be insufficient to order
security for costs,47 the existence of TPF or its terms should
not make a difference. The fact that the term absolving the
third-party funder from cost liability was in the limelight of
Armas and Unionmatex shows inherent prejudice against
third-party funded parties since the feared scenario of no one
being liable to pay costs at the end of arbitration would be
the same if there was just an insolvent investor and no TPF.
If there is no requirement for a claimant to prove its financial
standing to proceed with ICSID arbitration, then the same
protection should be afforded to those who are funded by
TPF—regardless of whether their funder is liable for costs.
III.

PUTTING THE HORSE BEFORE THE
CARRIAGE

Further, tribunals granting security for costs have missed the
more fundamental gateway issue of whether a “right”
entitled to preservation exists in the first place. Eskosol,
Anderson, and Lighthouse tribunals acutely noted that “the
starting point is identification of the particular ‘rights’ that
the applicant claims are appropriate to be preserved”—
which is to precede any decisions on whether “exceptional
circumstances” exist. 48
However, decisions ordering
security for costs have blindly accepted that security for
costs qualifies as a right to be preserved.49

47

Grynberg, supra note 41, at ¶ 5.19.
Eskosol S.P.A. in Liquidazione v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/50, Procedural Order No.3, ¶ 32 (Apr. 12, 2017); see also Anderson v.
Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, Decision on
Provisional Measures, ¶ 23 (Nov. 5, 2008) (“[A]t this point in the proceeding,
the Respondent has not proven the existence of any rights whose preservation
requires the requested provisional measures.”); Lighthouse Corp., supra note
41, at ¶ 56 (“The first requirement for provisional measures is that the latter
seek to preserve rights of the applicant”).
49
RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶¶ 72-74; Unionmatex, supra note 28, at
¶¶ 51–52.
48
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For example, in RSM, the majority tribunal limited its
findings of a protectable “right” to the bare-bone holding
that “conditional rights such as the potential claim for cost
reimbursement qualify as ‘rights to be preserved.’” 50
Similarly, the Unionmatex tribunal made a simple
conclusory statement that “Turkmenistan has specified the
right to be preserved.”51 Since provisional measures would
not be available without “rights” to be “preserved”, these
decisions indeed “put the horse before the carriage.”52
A.

ADVERSE COSTS – NOT A PROTECTABLE RIGHT

Security for costs reflects the applicant’s alleged “right” to
adverse costs. In 2017, the Eskosol tribunal first raised the
question of whether a party’s asserted “right” to collect a
possible costs award is one that is protectable.53 Notable
authorities have also noted this gateway issue raised by
Eskosol as one that is emerging and complex. However,
ICSID tribunals or other authorities are yet to address this
issue.54 Even in Eskosol, the tribunal did not answer this
question, holding that the Eskosol applicant would not be
entitled to security for costs even if it had a protectable
right. 55 This Article addresses Eskosol’s unanswered
question by dividing provisional measures into two
categories: those protecting procedural rights and those
protecting substantive rights. 56 This distinction is crucial
since a provisional measure (e.g., security for costs) must
50

RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶¶ 72-74.
Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 52.
52
ICSID RULES, supra note 20, at 24 (ICSID Convention, Article 47); ICSID
RULES, supra note 20, at 118 (ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 39).
53
Eskosol, supra note 48, at ¶¶ 32-36.
54
Markert, supra note 46, at 225.
55
Eskosol, supra note 48, at ¶ 36.
56
RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶ 69 (“The predominant objective of
provisional measures is to protect the integrity of the proceedings. This integrity
comprises both substantive and procedural rights”); Lighthouse Corp., supra
note 41, at ¶ 56 (“These rights can be substantive or procedural in nature”).
51
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serve the function of protecting either of the two rights.
This Article concludes that a party’s right to adverse costs
are not protectable since it is neither a procedural right nor a
substantive right.
(i)

PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

Procedural rights are those that are related to a party’s path
to pursue its claim or defense. 57 Compelling witness
attendance and preservation of evidence fall under this
category—for example, certain evidence may be required to
satisfy an essential element of a party’s claim. By
definition, procedural rights: (i) exist at the time of the
application and (ii) preservation of these rights must serve a
procedural function for the party’s pursuit of the claim.
In RSM, security for costs was categorized as a “procedural
right.”58 However, security for costs does not fit into this
category. First, there are no existing rights to adverse costs
since costs are awarded at the end of arbitration. Second,
security for costs does not serve a procedural function. As
the Eskosol tribunal noted, presence or absence of assets to
satisfy a possible adverse costs order does not impede a
party’s path to obtain a favorable award. 59 As such, the
Eskosol tribunal determined that security for cost is “not
truly a concern about a procedural right but instead an
outcome-related worry about collection on such effective
relief.”60

57

Eskosol, supra note 48, at ¶ 33.
RSM, supra note 28, at ¶ 64 (“the right invoked by Respondent can be
qualified as a procedural right not directly related to the subject matter of the
dispute.”).
59
Eskosol, supra note 48, at ¶¶ 32-33.
60
Eskosol, supra note 48, at ¶ 33.
58
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SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS

Since adverse costs do not protect a “procedural right”,
adverse costs must fall under the “substantive right”
category in order to give rise to a provisional measure.
Substantive rights are those that are related to the subject
matter of the dispute.61 Often referred to as a measure to
protect a party’s “right to an effective relief,” “maintaining
the status quo,” or “preventing further aggravation,”
substantive rights are those that ensure that a party’s rights
relating to the subject matter of the dispute will be preserved
until the final resolution.62 The intent is to ensure that any
final award on the merits is not impaired by acts taken by the
other party during the pendency of deliberation. Unlike
procedural rights, substantive rights need not exist at the
time of application and may be conditional on prevailing in
arbitration—as long as the right relates to the dispute.63 For
the purposes of this Article, non-existing substantive rights
shall be referred to as “conditional rights,” which is to be
distinguished from “hypothetical rights.”64

61
Amco v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on
Request for Provisional Measures, ¶ 3 (Dec. 9, 1983) (provisional measures
only protect “rights in dispute”); Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/24, Order, ¶ 39 (Sept. 6, 2005) (provisional measures protect “rights
relating the dispute”).
62
Amco, supra note 61, at ¶ 3; Plama, supra note 61, at ¶ 39.
63
Occidental Petroleum Corp., supra note 25, at ¶ 63 (Aug. 17, 2007)
(claimants “need only show that they allege the kind of claims that—if
proven—would entitle claimants to substantial relief”).
64
Occidental Petroleum Corp., supra note 25, at ¶ 89 (holding that provisional
measures are “not meant to protect against any potential or hypothetical harm
susceptible to result from uncertain actions”); See also Anderson, supra note 48,
at ¶ 23 (denying an application for a security for costs order on the ground that
“[r]espondent has only a mere expectation” and “has not proven the existence
of any rights whose preservation requires the requested provisional measures”).
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a. “Conditional” Substantive Rights
A “conditional right" can be construed to denote a right, the
existence of which is certain to arise when the applicant
prevails. Lao Holdings v. The Government of the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic is instructive in defining
what constitutes a “conditional right.”65 In Lao Holdings,
the dispute was whether the claimant was entitled to extend
its agreement with the Lao government, which would have
sheltered the claimant from the Lao government’s high tax
rates.66 The claimant sought a provisional measure seeking
to enjoin the Lao government from any attempts to collect
its taxes and from seizing the claimant’s property until the
resolution of the dispute.67 In granting claimant’s request,
the Lao Holdings tribunal noted that the “right to be
preserved” need not exist at the provisional measures
stage.68 Here, the claimant’s non-liability for Lao’s taxes
was a “conditional right” since it would have certainly arisen
if the claimant prevailed (i.e., the claimant was entitled to
extend its agreement with the government).
b. “Hypothetical” Substantive Rights
On the other hand, a “hypothetical right” refers to those
rights, the occurrence of which depends on factors additional
to prevailing in arbitration.69 This term was first coined in
a 1999 ICSID decision, Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain. 70
Here, the tribunal recognized that security for costs would
65
Lao Holdings v. The Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/12/6, Decision on Claimant’s Amended Application
for Provisional Measures (Sept. 17, 2013).
66
Lao Holdings, supra note 65, at ¶¶ 7-8.
67
Lao Holdings, supra note 65, at ¶ 9.
68
Lao Holdings, supra note 65, at ¶ 16.
69
See Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7,
Procedural Order No. 2, ¶¶ 16-18 (Oct. 28, 1999).
70
Maffezini, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 13-18.
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be based on a “hypothetical right” not entitled to a
provisional measure. Specifically, the tribunal recognized
that security for costs would be based on a “hypothetical
right” by noting that ordering security for costs would
require making two merit-based assumptions: (1) the
applicant will prevail and (2) the applicant will “deem the
claimant’s case to be of such nature as to require it to pay
[adverse costs,]” which would be inappropriate at that
stage.71 The Maffezini tribunal’s recognition is important
because it captures the delicate conundrum with security for
costs orders - - they seek to protect a right that will not come
into existence solely by the applicant’s prevailing on the
merits but, rather, they will only come into existence if the
applicant prevails and if the applicant also convinces the
tribunal that it is entitled to costs of the arbitration (i.e., a
“hypothetical right””).
Despite the crucial distinction between “conditional rights”
and “hypothetical rights”, ICSID tribunals ordering security
for costs failed to recognize this delicate distinction. This
failure is important because the RSM decision, the first to
order security for costs, is premised upon the overly simple
proposition that “rights to be preserved by a provisional
measure need not already exist at the time the request is
made” and that “conditional rights such as the potential
claim for cost reimbursement” are protectable.72 While the
RSM tribunal recognized the difference between existing and
conditional rights, it failed to recognize that some rights are
conditional and hypothetical. Following RSM, two other
ICSID tribunals relied on RSM for this proposition in
addressing security for costs applications. 73 This is
71

Maffezini, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 16-17.
RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶ 72.
73
BSG Resources Ltd. v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/22,
Procedural Order No. 3, ¶ 75 (Nov. 25, 2015) (“[W]hile the Tribunal
acknowledges that the right requiring preservation relies on two hypothetical
events (that the Respondent will prevail in this arbitration and that it will be
72
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troubling since the RSM tribunal fails to distinguish between
“conditional rights” and “hypothetical rights” and by this
definition, any right would be protectable—even those based
on conjectures and speculations.
A party’s entitlement to adverse costs is not a substantive
right because it is not related to the subject matter of the
dispute. By way of example, in the Lao Holdings case, the
respondent (i.e., Lao government)’s attorney fees would not
relate to whether the claimant was entitled to extend their
agreement. Further, a party’s right to adverse costs is not a
“conditional right” since prevailing in arbitration would not
give rise to adverse costs.74 As summarized by one of the
Unionmatex arbitrators, adverse costs are only awarded if a
party prevails and persuades the tribunal that the
unsuccessful party (a) advanced patently unmeritorious or
legally untenable claims, (b) abused the investment
arbitration process, (c) presented poor and inefficient
pleadings, or (d) engaged in egregious underlying conduct.75
In fact, successful parties were reported to recover costs in
only sixty-one percent of ICSID cases.76
Since a party’s right to adverse costs is neither a procedural
right nor a substantive right, it cannot be a right that is
protectable within the meaning of Article 47 -- a crucial
gateway issue that tribunals granting security for costs have
awarded costs), it nevertheless deems that the prima facie existence of a right
has been established.”); Lighthouse Corp., supra note 41, at ¶ 57.
74
Anderson, supra note 48, at ¶ 26 (“At this point in proceeding, the
Respondent cannot be considered to be a holder of a legal right, but only the
bearer of a mere expectation [to adverse costs]”).
75
Lucy Reed, Allocation of costs in international arbitration, 26 ICSID REV.:
FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 76, 84 (2011).
76
Matthew Hodgson, Investment Treaty Arbitration: Cost, Duration and Size
of Claims All Show Steady Increase, ALLEN & OVERY (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-andinsights/publications/investment-treaty-arbitration-cost-duration-and-size-ofclaims-all-show-steady-increase.
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failed to distinguish. This Article proposes that the
distinction between “conditional rights” and “hypothetical
rights” is significant because while both rights refer to
future, contingent events, only the former is protectable.
This failure to distinguish between protectable and nonprotectable rights has directly prejudiced third-party funded
parties since they have been the only victims to security for
costs thus far.
This Article does not propose, however, that all securities for
costs existing in international arbitration are invalid.
Instead, it merely posits that securities for cost orders in the
ICSID system present a problem because adverse costs are
not protected rights within the meaning of Article 47.
B.

“MERITS” – NOT CONSIDERED OR PRESUMED IN
FAVOR OF THE STATE?

Not only do securities for costs protect a right that should not
be protectable under Article 47, there is also a subtle, yet
powerful presumption that warrants attention. Tribunals
granting security for costs essentially make merit-based
assumptions in favor of applicants, including assumptions
that: (i) applicants will prevail; and (ii) applicants will be
awarded cost awards. However, they do not afford
claimants the same privilege. The Unionmatex tribunal, for
example, refused to consider a claimant’s assertion that
Turkmenistan’s acts caused its insolvency, claiming it as a
“merits” issue subject to later assessment.77 This imbalance
is significant because investors may face an early
termination of their proceedings before they have a chance
to prove states’ wrongful acts.

77

Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 66.
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In regard to this, the Unionmatex claimant made a comical,
but strong point that security for costs ordered against it
would encourage host states to “do the job right” to “better
ensure the investor’s insolvency and prevent any BIT claim
from the outset.”78 While this may sound comical at first, it
is not entirely inconceivable, especially for investors whose
assets are stripped away by states’ wrongful acts. It may
turn the David and Goliath biblical story into a reality,
except Goliath’s acts would be allowed to proceed without
legal repercussions.79
IV.

‘ARBITRAL HIT-AND-RUN’
- JUMPING THE GUN

As noted above, the concern underlying “arbitral hit-andrun” is that applicants will have to expend significant costs
to defend an unmeritorious claim but will be left with no
means to collect potential cost awards.80 The idea is that
investors, with the help of TPF, will indiscriminately “hit”
states with arbitral proceedings with the hope that one sticks,
and if it doesn’t prevail, it will “run,” leaving no one to
satisfy the cost award. 81 However, this concern is
unwarranted on three points: (1) third-party funders do not
fund unmeritorious claims—in fact, the existence of TPF
shows good prospects of success given the high level of due

78
79

80
81

Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 37.
Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 66:
The Tribunal must ignore Dr Herzig’s
allegation that it is unreasonable for
Turkmenistan to obtain security for costs when
it was Turkmenistan that allegedly caused the
insolvency of Unionmatex. This is plainly a
merits issue, subject to later assessment and
one on which the Tribunal expresses no view
at this stage.
Trusz, supra note 4.
Kalicki, supra note 15.
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diligence a claim undergoes in order to be funded; 82 (2)
ICSID rules have many other effective mechanisms to filter
out unmeritorious claims—which don’t involve penalizing
claimants for their financial status—including “screening for
manifest lack of jurisdiction before registration of a request,
a motion to dismiss for manifest lack of legal merit and
bifurcated preliminary motions”; 83 and (3) there is no
empirical evidence supporting “arbitral hit-and-runs.”
Only one case was found to allegedly support an “arbitral
hit-and-run,” S&T Oil v. Romania,84 which was not really an
“arbitral hit-and-run” case. In S&T Oil, the case was
discontinued because the third-party-funded claimant failed
to pay advance on costs after its TPF withdrew from the
case.85 Thereafter, there were notions made to the effect
that this situation could have quickly turned into a scenario
where the respondent could not have been able to recover its
costs,86 and that security for costs could somehow have been
the solution. This is what, in America, is referred to as
“jumping the gun, i.e., making a decision that is premature.”
In S&T, the case was discontinued from the claimant’s
failure to pay advance costs and, in any event, the claimant
82
ICCA Task Report, supra note 3, at 25 (TPF Applications have suggested
rejection rates of 90% or higher, and applications undergo a detailed due
diligence in order to ensure that there is a “solid claim with a healthy
recoverable margin”); Third Party Funding in International Arbitration,
(Feb.
21,
2020),
https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-andASHURST
insights/legal-updates/quickguide---third-party-funding-in-internationalarbitration/.
83
Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules—Working Paper, 131 at ¶ 242
(Aug. 2, 2018).
84
S&T Oil Equipment and Machinery Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/13, Order of Discontinuance of the Proceeding (July 16, 2010).
85
S&T Oil, supra note 84, at ¶ 32; See Umika Sharma, Third Party Funding in
Investment Arbitration: Time to Change Double Standards Employed for
Awarding Security for Costs?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (July 29, 2018),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/07/29/third-party-fundinginvestment-arbitration-time-change-double-standards-employed-awardingsecurity-costs/.
86
Sharma, supra note 85.
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would not have been able to proceed with the case.87 Since
this is the only case found to form the basis for “arbitral hitand-run,” there is a legitimate question as to whether this is
merely a premature worry based on a hypothetical situation
instead of actual cases.
V.

ICSID CONVENTION’S PROPOSED
CHANGES

Against this backdrop, the new Proposed Rules (PR) to the
ICSID Convention’s Arbitration Rules,88 if adopted, would
lower the threshold to obtain security for costs while making
other provisional measures more difficult. Pertinently, PR
14 would require parties to affirmatively disclose their TPF
arrangement, and tribunals may order disclosure of TPF
terms. 89 While disclosure of a party’s third-party funder
may be useful to prevent any conflict of interest issues that
may arise between funders and arbitrators, tribunals’
authority to disclose TPF terms seems problematic,
especially given that a TPF term absolving the funder from
cost liability was the determinative factor in the Unionmatex
and Armas tribunals’ decisions to order security for cost.90
Further, securities for cost would have their own stand-alone
provision under PR 53 and it is not in the third-party funded
parties’ best interests.91 First, under PR 53(4), TPF is out
rightly put under an unfavorable light with its mandate that
TPF “may not by itself be sufficient to justify an order for
security for costs.”92 While this rule seems to have the best
interests of third-party funded parties at heart, it is really a
87
88
89
90
91
92

See S&T Oil, supra note 84.
ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8.
ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 37-38. (Proposed Rule 14).
Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 57–60.
ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53).
ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53(4)).
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knife in disguise. The word “justify” draws a negative
inference for TPF. It presupposes that TPF would certainly
be a factor in favor of ordering security for costs if it were
accompanied by another factor. Second, PR 53(6) would
endow tribunals with the authority to dismiss proceedings if
a party fails to comply with a security for cost order.93 This
is meaningful given that, under the current rules, the only
express grounds for suspension of a proceeding are for
vacancy,
lack
of
jurisdiction
and
arbitrator
disqualification,94 none of which penalize a claimant for its
financial conditions. Last but certainly not least, PR 53
does not require a “rights to be preserved,” lowering the
threshold for security for costs even more.95
Meanwhile, all other forms of provisional measures would
be governed by PR 47, which provides more detailed
guidance on what warrants provisional measures by listing
non-exhaustive circumstances giving rise to provisional
measures (e.g., prevent imminent harm). 96
While
provisional measures are not restricted to these
circumstances, it nevertheless demonstrates the kind of
extraordinary situations that prompt provisional measures.97
Second, PR 47(3) explicitly requires tribunals to consider
whether provisional measures are “urgent” and “necessary,”
which is not always considered by tribunals. 98 For
example, the Unionmatex tribunal found that urgency is not
a requirement in issuing security for costs.99 They seem to
93

ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53(6)).
ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules (2006), Rules 9(6), 10(2), 29(3);
ICSID Arbitration Rule 41.
95
ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53).
96
ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 54-55. (Proposed Rule 47(1)(a)).
97
ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 54-55. (Proposed Rule 47(1)).
98
ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 54-55. (Proposed Rule 47(3)(a)).
99
Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 67:
Insofar as the element of urgency is concerned,
the Tribunal is not persuaded that
Turkmenistan must prove an urgent need for
94
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disparately treat security for costs apart from other forms of
provisional measures -- in order to make provisional
measures more difficult to obtain while ensuring that
securities for costs remain easier to obtain.
Third-Party disclosure—great. The ICSID Convention
would be better prepared for the likely growth of TPF by
preventing potential conflict-of-interest issues. But the
innuendo that TPF is a factor justifying security for cost
combined with the tribunal’s new-found authority to dismiss
proceedings upon non-compliance—maybe not so much.
Together, they carry significant due process consequences
for third-party funded claimants. Further, failure to
reciprocate changes in Proposed Rule 47 to Proposed Rule
53 should not be ignored. If adopted, these proposed rules
would serve the function of filtering out third-party funded
claims early on, for impecunious claimants, without any
regard to their assertion that the state’s misconduct caused
their impecuniosity. In light of prior decisions, one cannot
help but feel that the Proposed Rules are, and dare I say it, a
witch-hunt for third-party funded parties.100

the provisional measure of security for costs.
In any event, given that the arbitration remains
at an early stage with the final evidentiary
hearing not scheduled until September 2021,
the Tribunal perceives no urgency.
100
A similar attitude to a “witch-hunt” was captured by one member of the
RSM tribunal. See RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶ 18 (Assenting reasons):
My determinative proposition is that once it
appears that there is third party funding of
investor’s claims, the onus is cast on the
claimant to disclose all relevant factors and
make a case why security for costs orders
should not be made.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the previous three ICSID cases ordering security
for costs and ICSID Convention’s Proposed Rules, there is a
recurring theme—TPF. With growing appearances of
third-party funded parties in ICSID arbitration, the tribunals’
uniform position that there is no financial requirement to
proceed in ICSID arbitration seemed to have shifted, as
demonstrated by RSM, Armas and Unionmatex, revealing
their critical stance towards TPF. Additionally, the above
tribunals’ conclusory finding that adverse costs are
“protectable rights” within the meaning of Article 47 was
akin to putting the horse before the carriage since provisional
measures are only available for protectable rights. This
Article sought to address the Eskosol tribunal’s unanswered
question by distinguishing “procedural rights” from
“substantive rights,” which may be conditional but not
hypothetical, and proposed that a party’s right to adverse
costs is not protectable. Given that arbitral hit-and-run
concerns are not empirically supported by previous cases but
rather rest on a hypothetical scenario, and since there are
other measures to filter out unmeritorious claims, this Article
concluded that security for costs addresses a hypothetical
concern at the cost of investors’ real rights to pursue their
claims under the ICSID system.
Considering the ICSID Convention’s Proposed Rules and its
following implications, there is a legitimate concern as to
whether the ICSID Convention would still reflect one of the
purposes for which it was created: to provide a forum for
aggrieved investors to resolve their investment disputes—no
matter how poor they are and regardless of whether they are
third-party funded.
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